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Abstract 
The British government has identified ‘faith communities’ as a neglected resource in 
urban regeneration. This article first explores the context of official support for faith 
involvement in urban and neighbourhood policy and identifies the assumptions 
underlying key policy documents. These assumptions are then critically explored by 
reference to the links commonly drawn between religion and ‘community’, 
‘neighbourhood’ and ‘social cohesion’. Attempts to enlist faith groups within this 
essentially consensual agenda often fail to recognise both the potential divisiveness 
of religion and also the more positive and radical lessons that often stem from the 
action, experience and critical analysis of religious organisations and their members. 
 
Français 
Le gouvernement britannique a identifié les ‘communautés de religion’ en tant que 
ressource négligée dans le cadre de la régénération urbaine. Cet article explore tout 
d’abord le contexte du soutien officiel de l’implication de la religion dans les 
politiques urbaines et de voisinage et identifie les suppositions sous-jacentes aux 
documents de politique clé. Ces suppositions sont ensuite explorées de façon 
critique en faisant référence aux liens dressés communément entre la religion et la 
‘communauté’, le ‘voisinage’ et la ‘cohésion sociale’. Les tentatives d’implication des 
groupes de religion dans le cadre de ce programme essentiellement consensuel, 
omettent souvent de reconnaître le potentiel de dissension de la religion et aussi les 
leçons plus positives et radicales, qui proviennent souvent de l’action, expérience et 
analyse critique, des organisations religieuses et de leurs membres. 
 
Español 
El gobierno británico ha identificado ‘comunidades de fe’ como un recurso de 
abandono de la regeneración urbana. Este artículo explora primero el contexto de 
apoyo oficial en la intervención de la fe en la política urbana y de vecindad e 
identifica las suposiciones que subordinan los documentos políticos claves. Estas 
suposiciones se exploran de manera crítica refiriéndose a los enlaces en común 
establecidos entre la religión y ‘la comunidad’, ‘la vecindad’ y ‘la cohesión social’. 
Los intentos de alistar los grupos de fe dentro de esta esencial agenda consensuada 
falla con frecuencia en reconocer la división potencial de la religión así como las 
lecciones más positivas y radicales que a veces crece de la acción, experiencia y 
análisis crítico de organizaciones religiosas y sus miembros. 
 
Introduction 
In this article, we develop ideas emerging from recent empirical research funded by 
the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Farnell et al, 2003)1 using conceptual and 
theoretical literatures on religious diversity, the local and the global, and community 
and social cohesion. Specifically, we analyse the British government’s attempt to 
engage or, perhaps more accurately, enlist ‘faith communities’ in urban regeneration 
and neighbourhood renewal. We argue that official understandings of faith 
organisations are essentially congruent with consensus theory, stressing the 
potential of religious faith as an agent of community cohesion and neglecting its 
historical and contemporary involvement in international, national and local conflicts. 
We also suggest that this approach fails to recognise the complexity and diversity of 
religious faith and underestimates the extent to which faith organisations bring active 
and critical agency to ‘regeneration’. While faith congregations, organisations and 
their individual members may constitute clear interest ‘communities’ and form 
important nodes in local neighbourhood networks, many also offer an independent 
and critical presence based on understandings and practices that ‘transgress’ the 
boundaries of homogeneous ‘community’ and transcend a purely local 
neighbourhood focus. In this process, they challenge their identification by the state 
as readily biddable instruments for ‘social cohesion’ and ‘partnership’ and contest the 
‘place of faith’ assigned by the government. 
 
The article is organised in three sections. First, the policy context is sketched and the 
official perception of the potential contribution of the ‘faith sector’ is interpreted by 
reference to key documents and speeches. The remaining two sections assess the 
adequacy of this perception in relation to the diverse theologies, experiences and 
practices of religious groups and organisations. Our discussion offers a critical 
analysis of the discursive links made by government between, first, religion and 
community and, second, religion, neighbourhood and social cohesion. 
Religion, social policy and social welfare 
The agency and latency of religious institutions and traditions has been significant in 
the history of British social and urban policy and provision. In England especially, the 
care – and the control – of the established Church of England pervaded social life 
through its parochial organisation, and Christian social thought has been a significant 
influence on public policy (Farnell et al, 1994). There are few areas of social welfare 
that do not bear the imprint of religious motivations, ideas and action, from early 
‘reformers’ and philanthropists to the subsequent, and ongoing, involvement of faith-
based organisations and their individual members, both Christian and, latterly, non-
Christian. 
 
During the twentieth century, in keeping with a secular modern age and an 
increasing privatisation of religion, religious organisations were accorded a more 
subordinate role in relation to both policy making and the provision of social welfare, 
although churches and religious foundations remained important within the voluntary 
and community sectors. In the specific context of urban policy and regeneration it is 
only since the mid-1990s that there has been increasing reference to the potential 
role of ‘faith communities’ and official attempts to engage religious groups. 
 
A full interpretation of this tentative turn (or re-turn) to faith would require higher level 
reference to the crises of modernity, state authority and indeed Christendom in the 
face of cultural diversity and the challenges of alternative epistemologies. Some of 
these issues will surface in subsequent sections. Here, however, we identify three 
more immediate and contingent factors – changes in British political philosophy, the 
hard experiences of regeneration practice, and recent demonstrations of the 
involvement of religion in social conflict and division. 
 
First, although the inclusion of ‘faith’ predates New Labour, there are clear links 
between this and Tony Blair’s general crystallisation of the Third Way as a statement 
of the values necessary in a ‘modernised’ social democracy. Blair’s emphasis on the 
principles of ‘responsibility’, ‘community’, ‘partnership’, ‘social inclusion’ and the 
‘social cohesion’ of civil society invite a consensual and functionalist view of religion. 
Government is recast here as: 
... an enabling force, protecting effective communities and voluntary 
organisations and encouraging their growth to tackle new needs, in partnership 
as appropriate. (Blair, 1998: 4) 
This language owes much to a specific ethical variant of communitarianism (Levitas, 
1998; Johnson, 1999; Rodger, 2000). The concept of ‘community’ is made to work 
hard to distinguish the new ‘progressive’ politics from those of Old Left statism and 
New Right individualism. Yet it is defined in essentially conservative terms. The 
community is associated with shared moral values, where – within strong families 
and through effective parenting – social and civic obligations are learned, and where 
self-reliance, mutual aid and volunteering are practised. Community is seen largely 
as place-based, where relations form around local institutions, including religious 
ones (Hill, 2000). Such places are socially ‘cohesive’ and the link between the 
requirements of this political project and the promise of religion, defined in 
sociologically functionalist and consensual terms, is evident. Blair himself made this 
connection in a subsequent speech: 
Our major faith traditions – all of them more historic and deeply rooted than any 
political party or ideology – play a fundamental role in supporting and propagating 
values which bind us together as a nation. (Blair, 2001) 
A second stimulus to the official embrace of faith has been the continuing wide gap 
between aspiration and achievement in the involvement of ‘the community’ in urban 
regeneration practice. Despite the incorporation of community participation as a 
criterion for funding, first from the Single Regeneration Budget and later from such 
programmes as New Deal for Communities and the recognition of Local Strategic 
Partnerships, the community often remains a very subordinate partner (Mayo and 
Taylor, 2001). Finding ‘social capital’, accessing local networks, building ‘community 
capacity’ and securing genuine community representation has frequently proved 
elusive. In such a context, some policy makers, and indeed researchers, have turned 
eventually2 to religious congregations, organisations and their individual members for 
untapped potential, particularly in districts where religion may form a much more 
salient element in personal and collective identity than across Britain as a whole. 
 
An early development, pre-dating New Labour, was the formation in 1992 of the 
Inner Cities Religious Council (ICRC). This body includes representation from five of 
the largest religious traditions in Britain – Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim and Sikh 
– and is described as a forum where faith representatives and the government ‘can 
work together on urban renewal and social exclusion’3. It formed part of the Urban 
Policy Unit, with the role of “taking forward the agenda of the Urban White Paper” 
(DETR, 2001:1) and it also “relates to the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit and its work 
in enabling communities to participate in making towns and cities better places to live 
in” (DETR, 2001:1). 
 
Two subsequent developments serve to indicate the direction of policy. Centrally, in 
1997 the DETR produced a second edition of its guidance handbook on ‘involving 
communities’ in regeneration. This included a new chapter on the involvement of 
‘faith communities’, which argued that: 
... the contribution that faith communities can make to regeneration is significant. 
They can help regeneration partnerships to understand the needs and concerns of 
people living in particular areas, or groups of people with particular needs.… In terms 
of their active membership, churches, mosques, temples, synagogues and 
gurdwaras are often among the most substantial community-based organisations 
within an area. They have as much right to contribute to discussions concerning 
regeneration as residents’ or tenants’ organisations. (DETR, 1997: 149) 
Faith communities are commended both here and in the government’s more recent 
Neighbourhood Renewal Strategy in essentially pragmatic terms. Engagement with 
them is seen as a way of recognising diversity, a good “point of entry into involving 
the community” and reaching those commonly not engaged in the political or 
regeneration process: 
Faith groups may offer a channel to some of the hardest to reach groups. A 
pragmatic approach will be taken to funding faith groups, recognising that they may 
be the most suitable organisation to deliver community objectives. (Cabinet Office, 
2001: 52) 
Next, the Local Government Association (LGA), the ICRC, the Home Office and the 
government-supported Inter Faith Network collaborated in the production of a 
guidance manual for local councils working with faith organisations. This linked 
engagement with ‘faith communities’ to “the wider context of the modernisation of 
local government” (LGA, 2002: 7) and commended faith communities as having: 
• existing substantial involvement in their neighbourhoods and communities; 
• local networks, leadership, management capacity and buildings to contribute 
to regeneration; 
• memberships that include ‘hard-to-reach’ people with whom official 
regeneration initiatives are not connecting; and 
• a particular willingness of members to volunteer. (LGA, 2002: 7–10) 
This document makes an explicit and affirmative link between faith communities and 
‘cohesion’: 
Most of our towns and cities are places of great diversity – that is one of their 
strengths. Faith is an element in this diversity. But the benefits of diversity cannot be 
taken for granted. Relations between faith communities – and in turn between faith 
communities and local government – can make a significant contribution to promoting 
community cohesion. (LGA, 2002: foreword) 
Most recently, the development of the government’s partnership with faith 
communities has become consolidated within the Home Office and its Faith 
Communities Unit. The government’s interest in working with faith organisations was 
reaffirmed by this department in a new report (Home Office, 2004). 
 
In summary, the relative lack of success in securing genuine and sustainable 
community involvement and empowerment in regeneration has prompted a wider 
casting of the net to include religious organisations. In other words, policy has been 
prompted both by ‘Third Way’ principles and the pragmatic concerns of practice. 
 
Finally in this section, government policy may also be increasingly prompted by the 
apparent implication of religious identity in social conflict, rather than cohesion, as 
signalled by the ‘riots’ in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in 2001 (Cantle, 2001; 
Ouseley, 2001). Such events may have intensified the quest for the engagement of 
‘faith’ in urban regeneration and its implications for ‘community’, ‘neighbourhood’ and 
‘social cohesion’. They also serve to underline the historical and continuing centrality 
of religion in the construction of the contemporary world (Allen and Macey, 1994; 
Kumar, 1995) and its significance as a power resource that can be used either 
positively or negatively at state, community and individual levels. Like potent secular 
ideologies, it can unite or divide, include or exclude; it can provide the impetus to 
struggle for social justice or it can legitimise cruelty and oppression; it can promote 
social cohesion or conflict. 
 
In the remaining sections of the article we critically assess the tensions involved in 
these connections drawn by government between faith communities and urban 
regeneration. 
Religion and ‘community’ 
We have seen that government policy sees faith communities as having the potential 
to enhance community involvement in urban regeneration. In this section we 
question assumptions regarding the socially integrative function of religious faith; 
sketch the diverse and complex engagement in regeneration and social action of 
faith groups; and assess the extent to which faith organisations and their members 
can contribute to policies and practices marked by community and association as 
processes, rather than authoritarian end states. 
 
In negotiating the treacherous definitional terrain surrounding the idea of 
‘community’, it is common to distinguish between communities of interest or identity 
and communities of locality or place (Mayo, 2000), although this is a distinction that 
is prone to collapse. Hence, a collection of people may share a distinct ‘interest’ in a 
locality and its future, and ‘place’ can be an important element in personal and 
collective identity within an interest group (McDowell, 1999; Byrne, 2001). 
Nevertheless, this article makes an heuristic distinction between the broad idea of 
community as a sharing of interest and identity, and more placebased definitions that 
connect with the idea of ‘neighbourhood’ considered in the next section. This device 
is designed to allow the development of some distinct observations regarding faith 
communities and public policy. 
The underside of ‘community’ 
In both its generic sense and in its association with religious faith, ‘community’ is 
used discursively as a ‘warmly persuasive word’ (Williams, 1976) in elaborating 
strategy for achieving ‘social inclusion’. It has long carried an evaluative and 
conservative tone and is used to express nostalgia for vanished solidarities, often 
imagined and romanticised. Albrow et al suggest that community has been: 
… a potent myth to reinforce efforts to shape the ever-changing contemporary reality, 
to stabilise the state, contain disorder and limit the consequences of seemingly 
uncheckable forces of modernity. As such, it was intimately connected with the myth 
of cultural integration. (1997: 25) 
As a policy objective in today’s world, however, there are several reasons why this 
romantic notion of community seems progressively less congruent with ‘social 
cohesion’. First, idealised homogeneous ‘community’ in a context of ‘globalised’ and 
postmodern diversity is increasingly problematic and open to objection4. Second, 
groups defined as communities often have less internal coherence and unity than is 
implied by the term. Third, both these observations apply in the context of religious 
faith as much, if not more, as in other communal settings. 
 
To develop the first of these themes, there has long been awareness in political 
philosophy of the ‘underside’ of community. Specifically, ‘community’ can be a 
powerful principle and expression of exclusion. As Young argues: 
The ideal of community privileges unity over difference.…Community is an 
understandable dream … but politically problematic … because those motivated by it 
will tend to suppress their differences amongst themselves or implicitly exclude from 
their political group persons with whom they do not identify. (1990: 300) 
The growing cultural diversity associated with globalisation and migration brings 
challenges to previously legitimate authorities and renders encounters with “persons 
with whom we do not identify” increasingly frequent. In such a context any attempt to 
impose a ‘national community’ through centrally driven ‘social inclusion’ policies 
rooted in moral communitarianism seems problematic (Collins, 2000). In reality, a 
more Balkanised resurgence of ‘community’ is occurring whereby people’s response 
to outsiders is the creation of diverse forms of ‘refuge’ that constitute ‘purified’ 
communities (Sennett, 1966). ‘Community politics’ in such a context are often 
exclusionary, defensive, divisive and reactionary at a time when increasing diversity 
points to the need to find ways of ‘negotiating difference’, ‘transgressing’ the normal 
boundaries of interaction (Amin, 2002) and learning to live in: 
… social relations without domination in which persons live together in relations of 
mediation among strangers with whom they are not in community. (Young, 1990: 
303) 
Second, however, the internal homogeneity of such introverted and exclusionary 
communities should not be overstated or their internal politics neglected. The 
definition of community is a function of power relations, contested on the basis of 
material inequalities and the differing experiences, interests and perspectives of, for 
example, women and men or young and old (Mayo, 2000). In particular, internal 
differentiation between community members may result from their varying 
experiences of migration or residential stasis or uneven exposure to life outside ‘the 
community’ and opportunities or pressures to embrace a degree of cultural hybridity 
(Amin and Graham, 1999). ‘Community’ remains a process of social construction 
despite the pressures towards ‘purification’ sketched above. This tension between 
the quest for an ideal communal ‘home’ and the actual internal diversity encountered 
in real communities of interest, identity and place is evident – perhaps especially 
evident – in ‘faith communities’. 
 
Finally here, therefore, we point to the particular ability of religion to embody this 
external separation and internal authoritarianism that marks the ‘underside’ of 
‘community’. As expressed by a senior Anglican: 
There is a particular danger in religion.… For all religions claim to mediate the 
absolute. It is easy to topple over the brink and identify that absolute with the finite 
and fallible human structures through which that absolute is disclosed to human 
beings. In short, religion can reinforce religious communities and religious 
organisations in being impervious to criticism and thinking their claims override all 
others, even basic human rights. (Harries, 2002: 78) 
Thus, religion can provide the most total of all ‘total environments’ as currently 
expressed on both global and local stages in Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim and 
other religious fundamentalist or separatist movements and communities. On the 
other hand, when explored from within, many faith groups contradict external 
impressions of static and consensual communities, graphically confirming the 
observation that “small-scale societies are inherently pluralistic” (Heelas, 1996: 8) 
and encompass difference and controversy5. This signals that ‘faith’ may be more 
complex, variegated and problematic than suggested in official statements on the 
potential role of religious organisations in urban regeneration and renewal. 
 
The capacity of ‘religion’ to confound an assigned civic integrative role is the focus of 
the next section of this article. In the remainder of the present section, however, we 
explore further the very different approaches of various faith traditions to social 
engagement and identify a different ‘place for faith’ in regeneration from that which 
predominates in official UK government policy. 
 
Social engagement and the complexity of ‘faith’ 
The concept of ‘faith communities’ is a comparatively recent addition to public policy 
discourse. An extended exploration of this development is required6. The emphasis 
here, however, is on the way that this concept can serve to obscure the enormous 
diversity within and across faith traditions and organisations, including in their forms 
of social engagement and understandings of ‘regeneration’. Hence, the idea of ‘faith 
communities’ can encourage a view of ‘the faith sector’ as a relatively unified 
component of the wider voluntary or community sectors. This view of ‘faith’ is 
reflected institutionally by the inclusion of a single de jure or de facto ‘faith seat’ on 
regional assemblies and partnership boards. 
 
Such simplification of religious ‘faith’ reflects the limited ‘religious literacy’ that 
informs the formulation and implementation of policy, a concern made more acute by 
the marked religious diversity of many urban areas in Britain. This diversity is a 
central concern of the sociology of religion. It is neither possible nor appropriate to 
explore this terrain fully here7, but it is important to underline the complexity of ‘faith’ 
and to illustrate the many different forms of social engagement by faith groups. Use 
is made here of Castells’ typology of three forms and origins of identity building by 
social movements (Castells, 1997), for both faith groups (and their individual 
members) and non-religious organisations share many similar, historically intense, 
challenges to their identity and role: 
In a world of global flows of wealth, power and images, the search for identity, 
collective or individual, ascribed or constructed, becomes a fundamental source of 
social meaning. (Castells, 1996: 3) 
Castells has identified three types of response to a world “increasingly structured 
around a bipolar opposition” between the corporate global network society and the 
preservation of personal and collective identity (1996: 3). First, legitimising identities 
are offered by dominant institutions (principally capital and the state) to encourage 
participation in the approved institutions and processes of civil society. Here, 
religious congregations and organisations may take their place along with 
occupational groupings, trade unions, political parties and other civic associations. 
Second, if legitimising identities are expressed within the ‘network society’, 
resistance identities stem from outside it, as people build ‘trenches of resistance and 
survival’ on principles that counter those of dominant institutions. In the process they 
produce communities or communes with identities based variously on nationalism, 
religion and spirituality, natural philosophies, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, age and 
territory. 
 
Resistance identities are essentially defensive, expressing “the exclusion of the 
excluders by the excluded” (Castells, 1997: 9). Finally, project identities involve 
moving beyond the defensive to build a new identity to transform society in the 
manner of feminism in the twentieth century. Such movements produce social 
subjects working together to achieve a different life. These three types are not 
discrete – hybrids are common and groups and organisations change in emphasis 
over time. For example, bad experiences in roles within the institutions of civil society 
may engender among people and groups at the grass roots new ‘resistance’ 
identities, which may displace or combine with their earlier ‘legitimate’ identities. 
Or the knowledge and skills gained through involvement in both legitimising and 
resistance activities can equip people to assume radical project identities. 
 
Castells’ scheme has application to many faith groups, their present social missions 
and their likely responses to an invitation from the state to fuller engagement in 
official regeneration programmes. Our recent research (Farnell et al, 2003) found 
many Christian, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh groups undertaking a wide and very 
substantial range of activities that could fairly be described as ‘regenerative’, serving 
a variety of people and their needs. This work often extended beyond the local faith 
membership and into the wider district and city8. Such activity corresponds quite 
closely to Castells’ ‘legitimising’ type as faith groups offer caring, supporting and 
empowering services that augment state welfare. So, too, does the involvement of 
individual religious believers, in disproportion to their numbers, with the wider 
voluntary and community sectors and with local partnerships. Yet such activity can 
also often inform (sometimes radical) social critiques of the ‘disconnecting’ 
processes that impact upon the locality and its people. The frequently frustrating 
experience of seeking funding for locally perceived priorities or of participation as 
subordinate players on various partnership boards can serve to delegitimise 
dominant definitions of civil society and provoke demands for new priorities and 
processes. In particular, many are led to challenge the difference that ostensible 
‘regeneration’ makes for poor people and places and the reality of grass-roots 
empowerment (Farnell et al, 2003; Davey, 2001). 
 
Alongside these expressions (albeit often socially critical) of ‘civil religion’, religious 
belief is also prominent in social movements of resistance. As developed more fully 
in the last section of this article, some readings of all religious traditions can offer 
strong totalising responses to the hyper-connection, disconnection, segmentation 
and overall perplexity induced by global liberalism. Thus: 
Neo-tribal and fundamentalist tendencies, which reflect and articulate the experience 
of people on the receiving end of globalisation, are as much legitimate offspring of 
globalisation as the acclaimed ‘hybridisation’ of top culture – the culture of the 
‘globalised top’. (Bauman, 1998: 3) 
Such religious movements and their organisations offer a defensive alternative 
world, sometimes an important means of getting by, especially for members 
confronting exclusion. Theologies here are commonly pietist, making a strong 
distinction between the spiritual and the social, emphasising the former9. There are 
also, of course, graphic examples of religious fundamentalist movements that pursue 
radical or reactionary social change, thus displaying ‘project’ identities. 
 
Finally, therefore, religion can be the motivation for transformational projects. 
These may be politically conservative in their goals and centred on ‘extending the 
fold’ through proselytising, rather than moving outside it to a more open and 
networked social engagement. However, religious faith can also motivate and inform 
progressive and inclusive social engagement and projects that confront dominant 
institutions with progressive radical challenge. As noted above, these may stem from 
the experience of dissonance between attempted ‘legitimising’ civic roles and the 
actuality of life in ‘disconnected’ places. But action outside the officially sanctioned 
box may also be prompted by non-pietist, more ‘earthy’ social theologies (Farnell et 
al, 2003). 
 
‘Project identities’ are explored further below where we assess the capacity of faith 
groups to contribute to a redefinition of community as ‘process’. The preceding 
discussion can be summarised as demonstrating the fallacy in assuming a 
homogenous ‘faith sector’ that can be readily assimilated into regeneration 
partnerships. 
Community as process – a different place for faith? 
We suggested above that ‘faith communities’ are defined in current public policy 
essentially as repositories of values and moral traditions, and sources of volunteers, 
networks and material resources (notably buildings) to help in the ‘delivery of 
community objectives’. Even where they are identified in a social inclusion discourse 
as manifestations of cultural diversity, the emphasis remains on the functional 
potential of faith groups to supply the glue for ‘community’ integration. Hence, the 
offer may be one of enlistment into an agenda where, returning to Young’s 
argument, ‘community’ serves to deny difference (Young, 1990) yet in a context in 
which ‘the coexistence of diverse traditions and also cultural variety … is likely to 
increase rather than diminish’ (Bauman, 2000: 85). 
 
Bauman argues that the achievement of a non-oppressive integration in these 
conditions of radical diversity requires a readiness to: 
… recognise sense and dignity in alternative ways of life, to seek and find grounds 
for peaceful and solidary coexistence which are not dependent on compliance with 
one homogeneous and uncontested pattern of life. (2000: 86) 
Such integration requires a willingness to relinquish cultural purity and to develop a 
toleration of ambiguity, uncertainty and disorder (Sennett, 1971)10 where there are 
“social relations without domination in which persons live together in relations of 
mediation among strangers” (Young, 1990). Sandercock develops an explicitly 
utopian model of ‘cosmopolis’, a city marked by people’s willingness to engage 
respectfully and fearlessly with ‘the other’, to learn and to change by ‘transgressing’ 
across communal and cultural boundaries in “spaces of urban negotiation” 
(Sandercock, 1998; Davey, 2001). This integration-in-plurality emphasises longterm 
process and mediation whereby groups sharing a common culture and/or interests 
(communities) learn to work democratically in culturally diverse associations and 
forums. 
 
What might religious organisations and their members contribute to this? To what 
extent can they depart from their government-allotted role as functionally integrative 
‘legitimising’ communities and contribute to this potentially more openended and 
transforming process? An initial answer may be ‘not a lot’. Religious movements can 
present some of the most powerful and uncompromising expressions of introversion, 
authoritarianism and social disengagement in the face of globalisation and related 
cultural changes, a tendency underscored in the next section. Indeed, many would 
fail Young’s criteria for democratic representation as they practise various forms of 
discrimination and inhibit individual development (notably of women but also often of 
the wider ‘laity’). 
 
Yet, other religious traditions are more open, reflective, socially engaged, and 
committed to dialogue and to long-term learning and change. Therefore, while one 
response to current challenges is to retreat into certainty, another is to embrace 
change and its associated risks. To give a concrete example, there is widespread 
immediate and practical concern within the major faith traditions in Britain about the 
increasing disconnection of younger people from civic and religious participation 
(Farnell et al, 2003). In the case of Christian networks, this is expressed in an 
increasing variety of boundary-crossing experiments in new ways of ‘being church’ 
(Davey, 2001; Wier, 2002). 
 
Our recent research (Farnell et al, 2003) suggests that some faith congregations, 
organisations, projects and individual members operate in ways that are consistent 
with this alternative model, challenging official perceptions of the place of faith. First, 
although there remains a clear bias, rooted in history, to white Christian 
representation and involvement in urban regeneration, there is increasing 
involvement by members of other major faiths. While this participation might often be 
seen as ‘civic’ or ‘legitimising’, many develop strongly critical perspectives on the 
principles and practices of public programmes, some of which are essentially 
consistent with the principles of tolerance, mediation and negotiation in diversity 
sketched above. For example, it is common for faith spokespeople to contrast their 
own long-term perspective with the immediacy of secular regeneration targets. This 
longer view is underlined by the presence of faith groups as enduring worshipping 
congregations that both pre-exist and survive government initiatives (Farnell et al, 
2003). And while some faith-based initiatives are themselves topdown, many involve 
close listening to ‘the other’; negotiation of activities with actual and potential users; 
tolerance of risk, informality and uncertainty; and a refusal to assume congruence 
between official indicators of regeneration and users’ perceived priorities and needs. 
This reflects an understanding of ‘community’ (and perhaps democratic association 
and participation) as a long-term and ongoing process that formal programmes can 
actually disturb. 
 
Second, the research encountered several examples – Christian, Hindu, Muslim and 
Sikh – of the provision by faith communities of centres, sometimes highly impressive, 
often near or adjacent to places of worship but for use by people beyond the ‘faith 
community’. In some cases these are cross-faith ventures or are based on a mix of 
faith-based and public funds. Such places, addressing recreational, training and 
social needs, offer meeting places and the prospect of people beginning to  
‘transgress’ the boundaries of their ‘normal’ lives and to experience ‘relations of 
mediation’ as common concerns and objectives are explored across a range of faith 
and non-faith experiences. 
 
Third, some of the clearest examples of inter-faith meeting and of faith–secular 
encounter have occurred in political campaigns in opposition to government policy. 
Here, faith occupies a rather different and less consensual place than that envisaged 
by the state. For example, faith-based and secular groups have combined in the 
‘community organising’ tradition of Saul Alinsky (Furbey et al, 1997) to form local 
coalitions to fight campaigns on issues identified through processes of one-to- one 
listenin11. Elsewhere, Christian–Muslim dialogue has been developed through 
campaigns against the conflict in the Gulf in 1990 and that in Iraq more recently. 
Such activity offers contexts – still few in contemporary Britain – in which 
transgression occurs, otherness is encountered and diversity is negotiated and 
embodied in democratic organisation. 
 
This section has questioned official understandings of ‘faith communities’ and the 
incorporation of ‘faith’ within a functionalist understanding of community and of social 
integration. We have noted that the complexity of ‘faith’ is understated by 
government and that religion operates in various, sometimes quite radical ways, and 
contrary to official expectations. 
Religion, neighbourhood and social cohesion 
We now focus on the government’s attempts to harness faith communities in the 
pursuit of neighbourhood regeneration and social cohesion in contexts of religious 
and ethnic diversity. For it is in inner-city neighbourhoods that the challenge of 
‘otherness’ is most acute and where religion often plays an important, if not central 
role in people’s lives. 
Religion and ethnicity 
We noted earlier that government policy on the involvement of faith communities in 
regeneration is essentially pragmatic and implicitly functionalist. In fact, there also 
seems to be some acknowledgement within government thinking of 
phenomenological theory, though there is little, if any, of conflict approaches. Within 
a functionalist perspective, religion is a kind of ‘social glue’ that binds individuals and 
groups into the social and cultural order (Durkheim, 1915; Parsons, 1965); within a 
phenomenological framework, it provides a symbolic universe, or sacred canopy, 
that gives meaning to a world of otherwise potential chaos (Berger, 1967). 
 
As a device for promoting social cohesion, we suggest that this model of religion 
may have utility in mono-cultural contexts structured by singular, locally defined 
world views within which people subscribe to uncontested norms and values. But if 
such situations ever existed in reality, they are most certainly not the norm in the 
British cities to which government policy on social cohesion is directed. As Miles 
(1989) observes, this has serious implications for the likely success or failure of 
policy initiatives: 
As has been said on countless occasions concerning the unity of theory and practice, 
if the analysis is wrong, then it is likely that the political strategy will not achieve the 
intended objectives. (1989: 5) 
We suggest that the government’s policy on faith communities, urban regeneration 
and social cohesion has been developed with a damaging lack of reference to the 
large literature that exists in the field of ethnicity and religion. Both theory and 
research in this area point strongly to the frequently negative consequences for inter-
ethnic relations of an association between religion and ethnicity. For example, 
Wagley and Harris (1958) and Yinger (1986) stress the strength of religion as a 
central component of minority ethnic identity, which at first sight appears to support 
the logic of the government’s focus on religion as a source of cohesion. However, 
this has to be assessed in the context of other research. Rex (1991), for instance, 
found that this identity is frequently transnational in its orientation and source of 
influence. Several other theoreticians and researchers suggest that fundamentalist 
(or extremist) variants of religion tend to flourish, first, in situations of rapid social 
change and/or conflict (Macey, 1993); second, in response to the crisis of modernity 
(Bauman, 1991; Yuval-Davis, 1991; Kepel, 1994); and, third, among people who are 
in transition from one society to another, such as South Asians in Britain (Neilsen, 
1984; Robinson, 1988). Thus, Turner (1991) observes that religion can be 
particularly divisive within an ethnically or culturally diverse political collectivity like 
contemporary British society. What are the implications of this for government policy 
in relation to religion and neighbourhoods? 
Religion and neighbourhood 
The New Labour government in Britain has located religious groups within a place-
based neighbourhood agenda. Here they are seen not only as distinctive 
communities of interest with values and commitments to bolster social cohesion, but 
also as communities of place with local roots, offering a practical local engagement 
and helping to articulate local interests. However, we suggest that this definition of 
neighbourhood is problematic, in terms both of spatial scale and of the varying 
psychological and social significance of neighbourhood for residents (Kearns and 
Parkinson, 2001). Also, the relative importance of local neighbourhood identities and 
networks and their importance for social cohesion in a globalising world are 
uncertain. We argued earlier that globalisation and its related changes might 
increase the significance of space and place. However, in addition to the local 
neighbourhood, “there are many other sources [of social identity] partly dependent 
on our individual and collective time-geographies and action-spaces within the urban 
arena” (Forrest and Kearns, 2001). 
 
Faith groups are not to be identified simply with locality or neighbourhood. Of course, 
place has an importance, both practical and theological, in many religious traditions. 
Religious congregations, organisations and projects are often local and particular 
spaces and places are understood as sacred. Indeed, in some theologies, the local 
neighbourhood and also its people are seen as sacred and ‘the parish’ is a key 
principle of organisation and field of service and mission. In all faiths, however, this 
localism exists within, and often in tension with, membership of universalistic world 
religions, which are cultural carriers of globalisation (Kumar, 1995; Waters, 1995). An 
example here is when Muslims are expected to prioritise the ummah (the 
international Muslim fellowship) over other, more local, aspects of their lives. 
 
More materially, the compression of space and time exerts similar effects on faith 
communities as those on other social groups. At the city level, Christians 
increasingly travel longer distances to participate in worship and other activities. 
Many of the largest, and growing, religious congregations and centres are ‘gathered’ 
from well beyond the immediate neighbourhood. Moreover, members live in a 
globalised world in which a communications and transportation revolution has given 
people access to a wide spectrum of places and events, cultures and belief systems 
and, for some religious groups, a more diverse membership drawn from all parts of 
the world. This parallels their encounters with the greater social diversity of the wider 
neighbourhood and the world beyond and such developments and experiences 
encourage understandings that transcend the purely local or parochial and express 
“a deeply embedded transnationalism” (Davey, 2001: 32). This challenges official 
assumptions regarding the perspectives that faith groups and representatives might 
bring to urban regeneration since they are present both in local places and in the 
global “space of flows” (Castells, 1996: 410ff). Local embedding and global 
awareness can inform strong independence and intellectual and practical opposition 
to dominant interests12. 
 
However, this growing openness to the world is not universal and it is worth pausing 
at this point to question the meaning and the extent of the diversity that is stressed in 
government policy and in much recent social science. For the reality is that some 
British cities are diverse only in terms of overall population statistics, while everyday 
social life involves residential and social segregation where interaction across ethnic 
and religious boundaries occurs to only a very limited extent. Some of these are the 
very cities and neighbourhoods that the government is targeting and in which it sees 
faith groups as constituting “… a channel to some of the hardest to reach groups” for 
whom they are “… the most suitable organisations to deliver community objectives” 
(Cabinet Office, 2001: 52). That the government is concerned at the potential and, 
indeed, actual conflict that exists in such neighbourhoods and cities is clear from its 
emphasis on the need to develop community cohesion, but its focus on the role of 
religion in this process invites closer investigation. 
Religion and social cohesion 
Government policy on social regeneration now demands that projects demonstrate 
‘value added’ in relation to social cohesion. This approach has undoubtedly been 
influenced by the violent public conflict that took place in a number of Northern 
English towns and cities in 2001 in which both ethnicity (Pakistani) and religion 
(Islam) were implicated (along with class, gender and generation). Presumably, 
subsequent policy has been to develop cohesion across ethno-religious boundaries 
since, arguably, much of the conflict in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham was a result of 
too much cohesion within communities to the point that people live ‘parallel lives’, 
separated residentially and socially by ethnicity and religion (Cantle, 2001; Denham, 
2001; Ouseley, 2001). 
 
However, this crystallises some of the issues raised in this section in relation to the 
links between ethnic identity and religion; local versus global orientations and 
influences; the divisive role that religion can play in situations of ethnic diversity; and 
the tendency for fundamentalist or extremist variants of religion to flourish in such 
contexts. The city of Bradford is used here to illustrate the fallacy of assuming that 
religion and ethnicity are unproblematic or can easily be used to promote social 
cohesion. 
 
In Bradford, ethnicity (Pakistani)13 and religion (Muslim) combine to form a relatively 
closed community whose interaction with other residents (Asian, black and white) is 
frequently marked by conflict. The major public disturbance in 1995 and the riot in 
2001 received considerable national and international media coverage. What is less 
well known is that these incidents built on routine public violence and harassment, 
which, like the disturbances, is mainly perpetrated by young men from the Pakistan 
Muslim community (Macey, 1999a and 2002). The people and property targeted are 
non-Muslim – Asian, black and white, young and old, male and female. The 
exception is that young Muslim women are also verbally and physically assaulted 
(Macey, 1999b). Religion is invoked both to define targets and to legitimise violence 
against them. For example, gay men and lesbians can be assaulted because they 
offend against the Islamic prohibition on homosexuality; British public houses can be 
burned down because they breach the Islamic prohibition on alcohol (and getting rid 
of them serves the additional purpose of discouraging residual whites from staying in 
‘Muslim’ areas). Young Muslim women are accused of bringing dishonour to Islam in 
a variety of ways but significantly in terms of ‘Western’ dress and/or behaviour, so 
they deserve to be beaten (Beckett and Macey, 2001).  
 
This is not the place to discuss the many complex reasons for such behaviour. 
We cite it only to illustrate the extent to which religious teaching can be distorted to 
serve the interests of a particular, minority constituency14. There are further features 
of the Pakistani Muslim community in Bradford and its ethno-religious culture, 
however, that suggest that particular difficulties may arise in involving them in 
neighbourhood regeneration and social cohesion. Some of these relate to social 
inclusion, which constitutes another of the government’s concerns, and raise 
questions around self-exclusion versus social exclusion. Here, both the short- and 
long-term impact of racism must be considered. When the Pakistani Muslim 
community settled in Bradford nearly half a century ago, it was confronted by racism, 
including ‘far right’ political groups. In such situations, a common reaction is to 
retreat into older, more traditional forms of religion and ethnicity, and to construct 
relatively impermeable boundaries around the self (Wallman, 1986). This interacted 
with the community’s concern to maintain the language, religion and cultural 
traditions of its homeland (the latter two being frequently conflated) so that, then and 
now, many Bradford Muslims retain a transnational, rather than a local or 
international focus. This is linked to a highly negative view of the indigenous 
population because ‘the West’ is seen as a corrupting influence (Ballard, 1994; 
Shaw, 1994). Within this historical and contemporary framework, integration is 
resisted and minimum contact with all things Western is enabled through the creation 
and maintenance of Muslim enclaves that provide for the material, cultural and 
spiritual needs of the community. Pakistan is referred to as ‘home’, extended 
holidays are taken there and considerable sums of money are exported both to 
relatives and for the purpose of building houses (referred to as ‘mansions’ and 
viewed as a source of high status). Many people do not speak English (particularly 
women); conservative, non-English speaking imams are brought from Pakistan 
(Lewis, 2002); and more than 50% of marriages every year are arranged between a 
Bradford Muslim and a partner from Mirpur15. 
 
Thus, the Pakistani Muslim community in Bradford is an extreme example of the 
‘hard to reach’ groups being targeted by government policy on religion and 
regeneration. It is also an example of a highly cohesive community where religion 
provides the ‘social glue’ and world view that enables it to maintain separation from, 
and antagonism towards, wider Bradford (and British) society. This may not be quite 
the outcome that the Prime Minister has in mind when he proposes working with faith 
communities to enhance integration and deliver community objectives16. 
 
Our concern in this section has been to highlight some of the difficulties and tensions 
inherent in government policy on involving faith communities in neighbourhood 
renewal and social cohesion. This is not to suggest that there is no place for faith in 
these projects; it is to propose that a more theoretically informed analysis is 
necessary. In identifying the positive contribution of ‘faith’, some specific recent 
empirical findings can usefully be underlined (Farnell et al, 2003). 
 
Mainstream traditions within the major world religions connect the spiritual and the 
material. These theological understandings are a strong motivation for involvement 
in urban regeneration. Thus, religious commitment leads many individuals and 
groups to play a major part in local social action (see note 7) and to engage directly 
in both local and global struggles for social justice. Faith organisations and their 
members can bring to the table a local knowledge, history and orientation that 
delivers and sustains regeneration initiatives yet may also challenge the 
assumptions and implementation of official programmes. Their authority derives from 
their deep anchorage within Britain’s poorest places where religious leaders are 
often almost the only professionals who do not to commute to work.  
 
There are further reasons, both philosophical and pragmatic, for recognising the 
involvement of faith communities in urban regeneration. The former include, first, the 
fact that, for many people, faith is inseparable from their ethnic/cultural identity and a 
key motivation for social engagement. Second, a genuinely evidence-based and 
enquiring secular social science and social policy should not embody a premature 
dismissal of faith-based activity. Then, more instrumentally, in areas of dense 
minority ethnic settlement it is sometimes only through religious networks that 
contact can be established with and between people. Also, religious organisations 
often own the only buildings that are available for use by all who live in a given 
neighbourhood and in which meetings and a wide range of social and educational 
activities can take place. While many of these encounters involve a single ethnic or 
religious group, some are genuinely boundary-crossing, perhaps representing 
tentative steps towards an associative social cohesion. Areas characterised by 
residential segregation frequently offer few opportunities for interaction across the 
socially constructed barriers of ethnicity and religion. Such places open possibilities 
for people to begin to discover more fully a shared humanity with ‘the other’. 
Summary and conclusion 
Government urban regeneration and neighbourhood renewal policy in the United 
Kingdom now includes a ‘place for faith’, although religious groups and organisations 
are perceived in pragmatic and consensual terms. Instrumentally, they are identified 
as locally significant communities offering values, resources and volunteers, not only 
to develop and maintain their own projects, but also to underwrite the community 
participation now built formally into official programmes and institutions. They are 
linked functionally to a particular communitarian agenda as potential agents of social 
cohesion. This article has critically assessed these understandings of ‘faith’ and has 
questioned the assumed relationships between religion and community, 
neighbourhood and social cohesion, pointing to a complex reality marked by conflict 
as well as consensus. 
 
We have observed that many faith congregations and organisations already make a 
significant contribution to the ‘legitimate’ work of civil society through their own 
‘regenerative’ activities in and through their involvement in official schemes. Here 
religion can be said to contribute to social cohesion and ‘regeneration’. However, 
other faith traditions ‘resist’ such engagement and develop introverted or militantly 
sectarian responses to, for instance, the challenges of globalisation and social 
diversity. Some of these responses provide disturbing reminders of the exclusive and 
reactionary underside of ‘community’. This was illustrated above by reference to the 
combined impact of religious, ethnic and machismo identities in Bradford. In such 
cases, religion contributes to what may be viewed as divisive internal cohesion that 
militates against wider social cohesion across ethno-religious boundaries. 
 
We have also suggested that faith groups may present a progressive and radical 
challenge to their government-assigned ‘place’ in urban policy and practice. First, 
‘legitimate’ civil involvement in faith-based initiatives and in a long succession of 
official programmes can generate both expertise and frustration that often informs 
and prompts critical challenges to government policy and the interests of dominant 
regeneration partners. Second, theology and personal and collective biography often 
combine to ensure that faith groups do not offer simply a local perspective. 
Rather, they contextualise neighbourhood problems within a wider, frequently global, 
perspective and, in so doing, offer a radical critique of the, often narrow, analyses 
underlying area-based initiatives. Local action here may reflect ‘project identities’ 
linked to wider urban, national or global campaigns. Finally, in our empirical research 
(Farnell et al, 2003), we encountered significant examples of faith-based activity that 
begins from community identity, but moves decisively beyond this to contribute to 
greater recognition and valuation of difference. This is reflected in a willingness to 
work in associative democratic forums, where boundaries are ‘transgressed’ and 
differences negotiated, informed by a long-term presence and commitment to careful 
listening to subordinate voices. All this informs critical perspectives that are likely to 
challenge the ‘place of faith’ prescribed within a conservative communitarian 
discourse. 
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Notes  
                                            
1The interpretations of these data are those of the authors, not necessarily of the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. The authors differ in their understanding of, and commitment to, religious faith. Robert 
Furbey is a Christian and Marie Macey is an agnostic. 
2
 This study (Farnell et al, 2003) was one of the first in the field after over a decade of intense study of 
community participation and partnership working. 
3
 See Taylor (2000) for an account of the origins of the ICRC. 
4
 In the next section we develop this observation in relation to the interpenetration of the ‘global’ and 
the ‘local’ and its impact on ostensibly ‘neighbourhood’ faith groups. 
5
 Heelas makes this point in the context of an exploration of detraditionalisation. 
Internal pluralism is often compounded as people from relatively traditional societies migrate to 
Western cities. This may be particularly evident within religious groups and congregations in poorer 
urban districts that become the object of ‘urban regeneration’. For example, within the Catholic 
congregation in Burngreave, Sheffield, more than twenty different languages are spoken (Farnell et al, 
2003). 
6
 In the recent research to which the authors contributed, the idea of ‘faith communities’ was 
interpreted by some as denoting ‘non-Christian faiths’ or as a way of referring to minority ethnic 
status. This was particularly the case in districts with large ethnic minority populations where officials 
are uncertain in addressing residents’ ethnic and religious identities. Also, although recent policy has 
stressed a new inclusion of religious organisations, the concept of ‘faith communities’ may denote the 
marginalisation of religion in secular society as Christianity is displaced from its earlier status as the 
foundation for a ‘national community’ to that of just another interest community. 
7
 Davie (1994) provides a review of this field. 
8
 A study of Christian churches in the Yorkshire and Humber region alone identified 
6,500 ongoing social projects being used by more than 150,000 people, involving over 50,000 church 
members and employing 3,000 staff (Yorkshire Churches, 2002). 
Such data are not currently available for the other major faiths, but our research located significant 
social initiatives, again often serving non-members, provided by Hindu, Muslim and Sikh 
organisations. 
9
 More introverted religious groups of this kind are under-represented in our research 
(Farnell et al, 2003) since, not surprisingly, they proved ‘hard to reach’ and inclined to decline to 
participate in our research. However, the researchers also encountered examples of the internal 
diversity of apparently homogeneous religious ‘communities’ stressed earlier in this paper. For 
                                                                                                                                       
example, within some black-majority churches there was evidence of generational tension between 
the definition of the church as a protecting ‘home’ for older people and the search by some pastors 
and younger members for more open and networked social engagement. 
10
 Sennett suggests that this toleration is a means and a sign of human maturity. 
11
 The East London Community Organisation (www.telcocitizens.org.uk – last visited 3 October 2004) 
and IMPACT in Sheffield (www.impactsheffield.org.uk – last visited 3 October 2004) are two 
examples of the community organising approach that derived from the ideas of Saul Alinsky in the 
United States dating from the 1940s (Furbey et al, 1997). 
12
 ‘Thinking globally’ and ‘acting locally’ characterised the Jubilee 2000 campaign on debt relief in 
which religious groups played a prominent role. This is explored by Davey (2001). 
13
 Although for ease of recognition, we use the term ‘Pakistani’, most Bradfordians of 
South Asian origin are from the Mirpur district of Pakistan, which is a very poor, highly traditional and 
rural area. 
14
 The majority of Muslims point to Islam’s essential commitment to, indeed insistence upon, peace 
and non-violence. 
15
 Of course, there are many exceptions to the generalised description given in this section, including 
the young men whose violence is described in this paper. Other young people, particularly women, 
are making effective use of British education and employment opportunities.  
16
 It should also be noted that such objectives are likely to be defined by male, selfstyled, community 
‘leaders’ and to be highly traditional and unrepresentative of the views or needs of women and young 
people, and to reinforce the boundaries between Muslim and non-Muslim society. 
